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 Although banks and other financial institutions are important sources 
of capital, and although a chain of bank failures remains an important 
symbol of systemic risk, the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or 
enabling companies to access the ultimate source of funds, the capital (i.e., 
financial) markets, without going through banks or other financial 
intermediaries—is making these failures less critical than in the past. 
Companies today are able to obtain most of their financing through financial 
markets without the use of intermediaries. As a result, financial markets 
themselves are increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk.   
 
This has been dramatically illustrated by the recent financial crisis. 
Although the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers got the initial headlines, the 
trigger of the crisis was the collapse of the market for mortgage-backed 
securities. A significant number of these securities were backed by subprime 
(or risky) home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced through 
home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the borrowers 
could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. 
 
These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of investment-grade 
rated securities backed by these mortgages to be downgraded and, in some 
cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in these and other rated 
securities, and their market prices started falling.  
 
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed 
securities, was particularly exposed. Firms that had been doing business with 
Lehman—its ‘counterparties’—began demanding additional safeguards, 
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which Lehman could not provide. As a result, absent a government bailout, 
Lehman could not continue doing business.  
 
The refusal of the Government to save Lehman Brothers, and 
Lehman’s resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Securities markets 
became so panicked that even the short-term commercial paper market 
virtually shut down, and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities 
collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage assets 
underlying those securities.3  
 
The collapse became a death spiral as banks and other financial 
institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their 
value under “mark-to-market” accounting rules. This caused these firms to 
appear more financially risky, in turn triggering widespread concern over 
counterparty risk. The high leverage of many of these firms effectively 
required fire-sales of assets, exacerbating the fall.  
 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act prescribes many steps to attempt to 
prevent another financial crisis, most of these steps focus on banks and other 
financial institutions, not on financial markets. Such a limited focus worked 
well when banks and financial institutions were the primary source of 
corporate financing. But the financial crisis reveals that this focus is 
insufficient now that companies obtain much of their financing directly 
through financial markets—such as through securitization financing. 
                                                 
3 For example, in July 2008 I was an expert in the Orion Finance SIV case in the English 
High Court of Justice. Orion’s mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 
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Financial institutions and financial markets can both be triggers, and also 
transmitters, of systemic risk.  
 
ANALYSIS  
 
So how should we regulate systemic risk? The primary if not sole 
justification for regulating financial risk is maximizing economic efficiency. 
Because systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a 
central goal in its regulation.  
 
But systemic risk creates an added regulatory dimension: without 
regulation, the externalities—harm to third parties—would not be prevented 
or internalized because systemic risk is a risk to the financial system itself. 
Market participants are motivated to protect themselves, but they are not as 
directly motivated to protect the system as a whole.  
 
As a result, there is a type of “tragedy of the commons,” a collective 
action problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources 
accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to 
maximize use of the resources, whereas the costs of exploitation, which 
affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of 
persons.4 Any regulation of systemic risk thus should focus not only on 
traditional efficiency but also on stability of the financial system.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 cents/dollar, whereas the present value of its reasonably-expected cash flows would 
yield a value around 88 cents/dollar (because most of the mortgages were prime). 
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In examining regulatory approaches to systemic risk, one should also 
take into account the costs of regulation. There are direct costs, such as 
hiring government employees to monitor and enforce the regulations. But 
more importantly there can be indirect costs, such as overregulation that 
stifles innovation and competitiveness. 
 
Subject to that caveat, consider a range of possible regulatory 
approaches, aimed at making the financial system more efficient and stable, 
as a means of assessing Dodd-Frank. 
 
Averting Panics. The ideal regulatory approach would focus on 
eliminating the risk of systemic collapse from the outset. This goal could be 
substantially achieved by preventing financial panics, since they are often 
the triggers that commence a chain of failures. The financial crisis itself, for 
example, was initially triggered by financial market panic. But any 
regulation aimed at preventing panics that trigger systemic risk would 
almost certainly fail to anticipate all the causes of the panics. Furthermore, 
even when identified, panics cannot always be averted easily because 
investors are not always rational.  
 
Requiring Increased Disclosure. Another potential regulatory 
approach is to improve disclosure. Disclosing risks traditionally has been 
viewed, at least under U.S. securities law, as the primary market-regulatory 
mechanism. Dodd-Frank puts great stock in the idea of improving 
disclosure.  
                                                                                                                                                 
4 I originally introduced this concept in Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 
193 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1008326. 
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Disclosure works by reducing, if not eliminating, asymmetric 
information among market players, making the risks transparent to all. In the 
context of systemic risk, however, individual market participants who fully 
understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not 
necessarily the system as a whole. As my tragedy-of-the-commons 
observation suggests, a market participant may well decide to engage in a 
profitable transaction even though doing so could increase systemic risk, 
since much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be 
externalized.   
 
Furthermore, the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing 
complexity of transactions and markets—complexity being, I believe, the 
greatest 21st Century challenge for our financial system. In the financial 
crisis, for example, there is little question that virtually everything was 
disclosed regarding the complex mortgage-backed securities. Yet many 
institutional investors bought these securities based primarily on their 
ratings, without fully understanding them.  
 
There are at least four reasons why disclosure failed:  
 
(i) Investors overrelied on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. 
Dodd-Frank attempts to fix this problem by focusing on ratings, not on 
investors. However, the actions of S&P and Moody’s arguably met the Act’s 
requirements, had those requirements applied during the financial crisis. The 
real problem, I believe, is not rating agency failure but investor 
complacency. Because human nature can’t be easily changed, I’m unsure—
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and Dodd-Frank does not address—how investor complacency can be 
remedied.  
 
         (ii) Investors followed the herd in their investment choices. Again, 
this is an implacable problem of investor complacency. 
  
 (iii) Conflicts of interest were driven by short-term management 
compensation schemes, especially for technically sophisticated secondary 
managers.5 For example, as the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for measuring 
investment-portfolio risk became more accepted, financial firms began 
compensating secondary managers not only for generating profits but also 
for generating profits with low risks, as measured by VaR. Secondary 
managers therefore turned to investment products with low VaR risk profile, 
like credit-defaults swaps that generate small gains but only rarely have 
losses. The managers knew, but did not always explain to their seniors, that 
any losses that might eventually occur would be huge. 
 
This is an intra-firm conflict, quite unlike the traditional focus of 
scholars and politicians on conflicts between senior executives and 
shareholders. Dodd-Frank attempts to fix the traditional type of conflict but 
completely ignores the problem of secondary-management conflicts.6 
 
                                                 
5 See Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency 
Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1322536. 
6 Dodd-Frank’s attempt to fix the traditional conflict might actually backfire; recent 
research by UCLA Prof. Iman Anabtawi suggests that shareholders, even more than 
senior executives, want companies to take risks. 
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(iv) The retention by underwriters of residual risk portions may have 
fostered false confidence in buyers, in effect creating a mutual 
misunderstanding. Ironically, this could be exacerbated in the future by 
Dodd-Frank’s requirement that sellers of securitization products retain a 
minimum unhedged position in each class of products they sell. 
 
Imposing Financial-Exposure Limits.  The failure of one or more 
large and interconnected institutions could create defaults large enough to 
de-stabilize other highly-leveraged investors, increasing the likelihood of a 
systemic market meltdown. This suggests another possible approach to 
regulation: placing limits on an institution’s financial exposure.  
 
These limits could be imposed in various ways, such as (i) limiting an 
institution’s leverage; (ii) limiting an institution’s right to make risky 
investments; and (iii) limiting amounts of inter-institution exposure. 
Consider each in turn.  
 
(i) Limiting an institution’s leverage could reduce the risk that an 
institution fails in the first place. It also could reduce the likelihood of 
transmitting financial contagion between institutions. But limiting leverage 
can create significant costs. Some leverage is good, and there is no optimal 
across-the-board amount of leverage that is right for every institution. The 
Dodd-Frank Act, however, directs the Federal Reserve to set “prudential” 
capital standards for certain large financial institutions,7 including a 
maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 15:1.  
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(ii) Limiting an institution’s right to make investments is a highly 
paternalistic approach, substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a 
firm’s own business judgment. One should be highly skeptical of any rule 
that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial institution from itself. 
Dodd-Frank implementation of the Volker Rule, however, attempts to do 
precisely that by limiting the ability of banks and certain other financial 
institutions to engage in “proprietary trading”—essentially investing in 
securities for their own account.8 
 
(iii) Inter-institution financial-exposure limits would facilitate stability 
by diversifying risk, in effect by reducing the losses of any given contractual 
counterparty and thus the likelihood that such losses would cause the 
counterparty to fail. Limits also might reduce the urgency, and hence the 
panic, that contractual counterparties feel about closing out their positions. 
 
This approach already applies to banks through lending limits, which 
restrict the amount of bank exposure to any given customer’s risk. Its 
application beyond banks to other financial institutions is potentially 
appealing given the increasing blurring of lines between banks and non-bank 
financial institutions and the high volumes of financial assets circulating 
among non-bank financial entities.  
 
It is questionable, though, whether the government should impose 
financial exposure limits on large financial institutions. These institutions 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Banks are already subject to the Basle capital requirements. 
8 I could, however, see the merit of a more nuanced rule limiting proprietary trading 
keyed into the tragedy-of-the-commons problem.   
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already try to protect themselves through risk management and risk 
mitigation. The financial crisis has raised questions, however, whether 
conflicts of interest among managers and other failures can undermine 
institutional risk management. Dodd-Frank addresses this problem by 
requiring many large public financial firms to establish risk committees, 
including at least one risk-management expert, to be responsible for 
enterprise-wide risk management oversight. 
 
Limiting Financial Institution Size.  This is related to financial 
exposure limits; but here there is also the moral-hazard potential that 
institutions who believe they are “too big to fail” will engage in risky 
projects. There is, however, no clear evidence of such risky behavior, and 
financial institutional losses in the recent financial crisis can be explained by 
other reasons.   
 
I would caution against artificially limiting financial institution size. 
Size should be governed by the economies of scale and scope needed for 
institutions to successfully compete, domestically and abroad—so long as 
that size is manageable.  
 
We should watch out, however, for institutions that increase their size, 
especially by acquisition of other institutions, primarily to satisfy senior 
management egos. Dodd-Frank indirectly addresses this concern by (at least 
weakly) linking senior executive compensation to long-term results—for 
example, requiring stock exchanges to adopt standards whereby listed 
companies implement policies to recoup senior executive compensation in 
the event of an accounting restatement.  
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Ensuring Liquidity.  Ensuring liquidity could facilitate stability in two 
ways: by providing liquidity to prevent financial institutions from defaulting, 
and by providing liquidity to financial markets as necessary to keep them 
functioning.  
 
The Federal Reserve Bank has had the role (under §13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act) of providing liquidity to prevent banks and other 
financial institutions from defaulting, by acting as a lender of last resort. 
Acting as a lender of last resort to institutions can be costly, however. By 
providing a lifeline, a lender of last resort can at least theoretically foster 
moral hazard by encouraging financial institutions—especially those that 
believe they are “too big to fail”—to be fiscally reckless. It also can shift 
costs to taxpayers since loans made to institutions will not be repaid if the 
institutions eventually fail.  
 
For these reasons, the Dodd-Frank Act sharply limits the power of the 
Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or insolvent 
financial institutions. That categorical limitation appears somewhat 
excessive, though; a lender of last resort can be an important safeguard if it 
acts judiciously. 
 
One way that Dodd-Frank attempts to avoid the need to make 
emergency loans is by requiring banks and—to the extent designated as 
“systemically important,” other financial firms—to be subject to a range of 
capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements and periodic “stress testing.” It 
also requires these entities to submit a resolution plan (a “living will”) that 
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sets forth how, if it fails, the firm would wind down in a way that minimizes 
systemic impact. The intention is to prevent a failure and, if a failure occurs, 
to mitigate the need for emergency loans by allowing the firm to fail. The 
ultimate question, though, will be whether the ex ante plan matches the ex 
post reality.  
 
Regardless of how one views a lender of last resort to financial 
institutions, the financial crisis has shown that, in an era of 
disintermediation, more attention needs to be focused on providing liquidity 
to financial markets as necessary to keep them functioning. This approach 
should also be less costly than lending to institutions. A market liquidity 
provider of last resort, especially if it acts at the outset of a market panic, can 
profitably invest in securities at a deep discount from the market price and 
still provide a “floor” to how low the market will drop. Buying at a deep 
discount will mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely that the market 
liquidity provider will be repaid.  
 
Reducing Complexity.  An obvious way to address complexity would 
be to require investments and other financial products to be more 
standardized, so market participants do not need to engage in as much due 
diligence.  
 
One of the goals of Dodd-Frank is to standardize more derivatives 
transactions. To this end, the Act requires many derivatives to be cleared 
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through clearinghouses, which generally require a high degree of 
standardization in the derivatives they clear.9  
 
The overall economic impact of standardization is unclear, though, 
because standardization can interfere with the ability of parties to achieve 
the efficiencies that arise when firms issue securities tailored to particular 
needs of investors.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
I would recommend at least three regulatory initiatives that go beyond 
Dodd-Frank: (1) require that managers, including secondary managers, of 
financial institutions be compensated based more on long-term firm 
performance; (2) establish a market liquidity provider of last resort; (3) 
require financial institutions of systemic significance to contribute to a fund 
that would be used to mitigate systemic externalities. 
 
Let me expand on the latter two recommendations, which may not be 
obvious on their face.  
 
A market liquidity provider of last resort would have the best chance 
of minimizing a systemic collapse under any number of circumstances. 
Chaos theory supports the concept of a market liquidity provider of last 
resort. In complex engineering systems, as in complex financial markets, 
                                                 
9 This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd-Frank includes an exception for 
derivatives that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. Query also the extent to 
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failures are inevitable. Therefore modularity is needed to break the 
transmission of these failures and limit their systemic consequences. Such a 
mechanism usually exists (or should exist) for banks, in the form of a 
liquidity provider of last resort; we also need this type of mechanism for 
complex financial markets.10 
 
Recent experience in the financial crisis supports establishment of a 
market liquidity provider of last resort. In response to the collapse of the 
commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve created the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a lender of last resort for that 
market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” by 
purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not 
otherwise sell their paper.11 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the 
commercial paper market.12 
 
One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can 
invest at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private 
investors won’t also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of 
governmental market liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at 
investing firms will not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by 
causing their firms to invest at a time when other investors have abandoned 
the market. Another answer is that private investors usually want to buy and 
                                                                                                                                                 
which the clearinghouse requirement will inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the 
clearinghouses themselves. 
10 See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW 211 (2009/2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1240863. 
11 See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, ‘The Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility,” FRBNY Econ. Policy Rev. (forthcoming). 
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sell securities, not waiting for their maturities, whereas a market liquidity 
provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary.  
 
My third recommendation—to require financial institutions of 
systemic significance to contribute to a systemic risk fund—responds to the 
tragedy-of-the-commons problem by helping to mitigate systemic 
externalities. This type of approach was originally in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
but it was taken out before enactment because of opposition by politicians 
who believed (in my opinion, wrongly) that it would increase moral hazard 
by institutionalizing bailouts.  
 
A privately-funded systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic 
externalities but also can help minimize the potential for risky behavior 
caused by institutions that believe they are too big to fail. The too-big-to-fail 
problem is effectively an externality imposed on government (and ultimately 
taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such risky behavior. A privately-
funded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that externality. 
Furthermore, the ability of government to require additional contributions to 
this type of fund should motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each 
other to reduce the potential for such risky behavior.  
 
Recently, the European Commission has been toying with the idea of 
a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial 
sector. Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently unresolved, 
news reports indicate that an originally contemplated use was a systemic risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the 
commercial paper market”). 
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fund. The IMF also appears to be using the European Commission tax 
proposal as a platform to announce that ‘new taxes on banks [are] needed to 
provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to curb 
excessive risktaking.’13  
 
The European Commission recognizes that to avoid making the EU 
financial sector uncompetitive, any tax on the financial sector should be 
applied in all financial centres. This illustrates a broader principle: because 
financial markets and institutions increasingly cross sovereign borders, any 
regulatory approaches must be designed to work in an international context. 
The Dodd-Frank Act does not, however, fully come to grips with how the 
U.S. financial regulatory framework should operate, or even fit, as part of a 
global financial regulatory framework. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We have made some, but not nearly enough, progress in identifying 
and managing systemic risk. Hopefully my talk this evening has illustrated 
some of the progress, and some of the limitations. 
 
Being a political response, Dodd-Frank consists largely of politically 
targeted responses to the recent financial crisis, at times looking for villains 
(whether or not they exist) who caused the crisis. To be most effective, 
however, financial regulation must be situated within an analytical 
framework that realistically explains how systemic risk is transmitted and 
                                                 
13 Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2010, at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by 
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
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why free-market factors do not limit that transmission.14 The tragedy of the 
commons, for example, is certainly part of that explanation.15  
 
The Dodd-Frank Act nonetheless has the potential to ultimately reach 
beyond politically targeted responses. The Act delegates much of the 
regulatory details to administrative rulemaking, in many cases after the 
relevant government agencies engage in further study. Perhaps even more 
significantly, the Act creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of 
whose mission is to monitor and identify potential systemic threats in order 
to find regulatory gaps. The Council will be aided in this task by a newly-
created and, we all should hope, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research.   
 
Thank you. 
 
 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, forthcoming in 
86 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, issue no. 4 (Spring 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025. 
15 Indeed, I have argued that the failures giving rise to the recent financial crisis can be 
attributed conceptually to at least four market imperfections: conflicts of interest, 
complacency of investors and other market participants, complexity of financial markets 
and of the securities traded therein, and the tragedy of the commons. See Understanding 
the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S. C. L. REV. 549 (2009). My talk this evening 
references all of these failures. 
